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STATE OF UTAH 
T A T E S , INC. 
Plaintiff-A ppellant, 
vs. 
L I T T L E A M E R I C A R E F I N I N G 





B R I E F O F P L A I N T I F F - A P P E L L A N T 
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E CASE A N D 
D I S P O S I T I O N IN L O W E R COURT 
Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant for 
the balance due on a contract for the purchase of a bus. 
The Court held that the plaintiff's acceptance of a check 
for an amount less than that due resulted in an accord 
and satisfaction and dismissed the plaintiff's action and 
denied recovery by the plaintiff. The Court also denied 
plaintiff's claim for $845.00 damages to a bus loaned 
to defendant. There is no dispute concerning the exist-
ence of the contract, the original contract price of $28,-
514.37, nor the amount paid by defendant of $25,107.11. 
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There is no issue involving breach of contract or can-
cellation of the contract since both parties sought per-
formance of the contract. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Plaintiff seeks to reverse the decision of the lower 
court and prays for a judgment in its favor for the sum 
of $3,407.26 plus interest at the rate of 18% per annum 
from delivery date of the bus January 16, 1973 to 
present, costs of this proceeding and reasonable attor-
ney's fees and the sum of $845.00 for damages to its 
loaner bus with interest at the rate of 6% per annum 
from January 16,1973 to date. 
S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S 
On the 21st day of January, 1972, the defendant-
respondent, Little America, entered into an agreement 
to purchase a new bus from plaintiff-appellant, Tates, 
Inc. for the sum of $26,176.66 without State or Federal 
tax. With Federal tax, the balance to be paid was $28,-
514.37. In its letter of January 12, 1972 (Ex. I P ) 
setting forth specifications, the plaintiff stated in re-
gards to delivery: 
" I was talking to our Madsen Factory 
and find we could make approximate 45 day 
delivery on the chassis and about the same time 
on the body after we received the chassis. Or 
approximate 90 day delivery after receipt of 
order." 
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The purchase order was signed by Mr. Knight, 
Executive Vice President of defendant, Little America, 
on January 21, 1972 (Ex. 2P) . He had been dealing 
principally with Mr. Knaus and Mr. Urie, representa-
tives of plaintiff, Tates, Inc. 
The Madsen plant which builds the chassis en-
countered delays in production and the bus was not 
ready for delivery until January 16, 1973. During this 
delay period, the representatives of plaintiff and de-
fendant had constant contact. Mr. Knight of defendant 
company urged delivery and Mr. Knaus of plaintiff 
company regularly contacted the Madsen company 
trying to get delivery of the bus (R. 52,61). The de-
fendant did not cancel the contract, but on the contrary 
continued to affirm the contract and sought delivery 
as soon as possible. 
When Madsen finished its part of the contract, it 
billed plaintiff for its costs and plaintiff billed defen-
dant for part payment. After some delay and discus-
sions, defendant paid $10,000.00 in a check made out to 
plaintiff and Madsen dated November 11, 1972 (Ex. 
5D). At the time the check was given to plaintiff, Mr. 
Knaus and Mr. Knight discussed the completion of the 
bus and in Mr. Knight's own words, Mr. Knaus felt 
confident the bus would be completed by the end of 
November (R.99). 
In order to assist the defendant as a courtesy (R. 
60) but without being obligated the plaintiff bought 
a used, exceptionally clean bus in Boise, Idaho brought 
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it to Salt Lake for defendant's use in July, 1972. The 
bus cost $1,816.00 (R.57-59). The bus was in good run-
ning condition when delivered but was burned up by 
defendant who had to have it repaired and claims the 
cost of the repairs against the plaintiff in the amount 
of $239.76 (Ex. 4D). Bus was returned to plaintiff 
near December, 1972 with motor completely burned 
out, costing plaintiff $845.00 which plaintiff claims 
should be paid by defendant. 
After November the defendant rented a bus and 
claims the plaintiff should pay the cost of renting the 
bus which is $3,167.50, which when added to $239.76 
totals $3,407.26 (Ex. 6D). 
The new bus was delivered to defendant January 
16, 1973 and a delivery receipt and bill was signed by 
defendant's representative, Dave Timlinson, stating the 
total price of $28,514.37 and calling for payment of 
18% interest, collection costs and attorney's fees if re-
quired for collection (Ex. 3P) . Mr. Timlinson drove 
the bus away and that delivery receipt and Tates official 
billing were sent to defendant on or soon after January 
16, 1973. The billing called for payment of a balance 
of $18,514.37 (Ex. 8D). 
On or about February 12, 1973 at Mr. Knight's 
request he and Mr. Knaus met to go over the matter 
of defendant's expenses and as Mr. Knight testified: 
" . . . I had accumulated my expenses since that 
date (Nov. 30) and I enumerated those and 
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told him that these were expenses that we in-
curred. And he said that they should be put 
down and they would go back to the manu-
facturer so they—to see what they could do 
about it and that we would go from there/' 
(R. 100). (Italics added.) 
Mr. Knight did not know if he actually went through 
the bills then or not, but prepared them for Mr. Knaus 
as part of his letter of February 12, 1973 so that Mr. 
Knaus would have them to submit to the manufacturer. 
Mr. Knaus received the letter of February 12, 1973 
(Ex. 6D) and submitted it to the manufacturer as 
promised. He was not bound by them nor did he receive 
them as an ultimatum but expected them and re-
ceived them to send on to the manufacturer and "go 
from there". 
The defendants sent a check for $15,107.11 dated 
February 17, 1973 (Ex. 7D) which p l a i n t i f f 
credited to the defendants' account on Wednesday, 
February 21, 1973 (Ex. 8D). I t was received as a pay-
ment on the account while waiting the outcome of a 
demand on the manufacturer. On or about February 21, 
1973 defendant was billed for the balance due of $3,-
407.26 (Ex. 8D). On Tuesday, February 27, 1973 an 
office note was made to see Mr. Knight, an appointment 
was made by phone and the appointment kept on Mon-
day, March 5, 1973 at which time Mr. Knaus renewed 
his demand for the money yet due of $3,407.26 and Mr. 
Knight stated he wasn't going to pay it. (R. 92, 93). 
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The manufacturer had refused to waive the balance 
due of $3,407.26 and threatened to sue plaintiff. This 




THERE WAS A COMPLETE CONTRACT 
BETWEEN T H E PARTIES REQUIRING 
T H E DEFENDANT TO PAY P L A I N T I F F 
$28,514.37. THE CONTRACT WAS NEVER 
VOIDED, CANCELLED OR ALTERED BY 
T H E PARTIES AND UPON DELIVERY OF 
THE BUS WITHOUT OBJECTION AND AC-
KNOWLEDGMENT OF T H E BILLING AT 
TIME OF DELIVERY T H E PERFORMANCE 
WAS COMPLETED AND THE FULL BAL-
ANCE OF T H E CONTRACT PRICE WAS DUE 
AND OWING. 
As mentioned above there is no dispute concerning 
the contract price for the purchase of the bus as being 
$28,514.37. Nor is there any dispute concerning the fact 
that defendant paid only $25,107.11 leaving a balance 
unpaid in the amount of $3,407.26. 
The defendant claims the plaintiff agreed to make 
delivery of the bus in 90 days. This is not the case. The 
plaintiff never did guarantee nor even agree to make 
delivery in 90 days but merely relayed to the purchaser 
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what the factory had indicated it might could do. Mr. 
Knaus wrote in his letter of January 12, 1972: 
"I was talking to our Madsen Factory add 
find we could make, approximate 45 day deli-
very on the chassis and about the same time 
on the body after we received the chassis. Or 
approximate 90 day delivery after receipt of 
order." (Ex. I P ) 
Note the days are stated as approximate 45 days 
and approximate 90 days. Even if we should concede 
ultimate delivery was not within approximately 90 days 
the fact is the defendant never sought to cancel the con-
tract for breach or any other reason but continued to 
confirm the contract. 
Mr. Knight stated in answer to cross examination: 
" P before or during the summer of '72 or 
the fall or the winter of '72 did you ever tell 
him that he had breached his contract and that 
you were not going to comply with it? 
A. No. 
Q. In fact, you wanted that bus, did you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you find out how much it would cost 
you if you ordered a new bus of similar quality 
and ascertain what you might be up against 
in that regard? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Would it be quite a bit in excess of what 
you have already bargained for ? 
A. Yes and no. I priced a Flexible bus and 
it was more. I priced another type of bus and 
it was in the same neighborhood. 
Q. In any regard, you decided you would go 
with the contract you had originated with these 
parties, did you not? 
A. Yes." (R. 123) 
In its answer to interrogatories paragraph 4 defen-
dants acknowledge the contract, the contract price and 
the balance of $3,407.26. (R.18) 
No new contracts ever were agreed to or made up. 
The direct examination of Mr. Knaus reads as follows: 
Q. During your conversation with Mr. 
Knight either before or after delivery of the 
bus, was there ever any new contract made up ? 
A. No." (R. 74) 
Mr. Knaus gave the same answer in response to 
cross examination concerning either a written or oral 
new contract. (R. 75) 
Mr. Urie of Tates, Inc. on direct examination 
stated : 
"Q. Are you aware of any other documents 
that may have changed that purchase order or 
the agreement connected with it? 
A. I am not. 
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Q. Are there any to your knowledge? 
A. There are none to my knowledge." (R. 
79) 
The plaintiff's representatives regularly checked 
on production and demanded delivery but could not 
secure delivery for defendant at any earlier date. (R. 
52,61,123,124) 
The defendants accepted delivery of the bus on 
January 16, 1973, (R. 64) by sending a duly author-
ized representative as conceded by counsel for defendant, 
Mr. Bird, who stated: "Admit he got into the bus and 
drove away also admit he was our employee for that 
purpose." (R. 78) 
Mr. Urie was present when bus was delivered. Mr. 
Timlin-son, who picked up the bus, stated he was an em-
ployee. He signed the original of the Exhibit 3 combina-
tion invoice, billing and delivery receipt as an agent 
and "Took delivery of the bus and left our premises". 
(R. 77, 78) There was no objection to the billing for 
$28,514.37 at the time of delivery. (R, 79) Defendants 
answer to interrogatories reads: 
"Q. Did defendant or any of its agents refuse 
or object to delivery at the time the bus was 
delivered? 
A. Little America and its agents did not 
refuse or object to delivery at the time the bus 
was delivered. I t was received by the driver on 
January 16, 1973, and it was necessary to re-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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turn the bus to plaintiffs for repair of defects 
on January 28, 29 and 30, 1973." (R. 18) 
Q. Did defendants or any of its agents notify 
the plaintiff at any time that it would not 
accept delivery of the bus. . ? 
A. Little America and its agents did not at 
any time contend they would not accept de-
livery, but, to the contrary, were very anxious 
to receive delivery of the new bus at the earliest 
possible date . . . " (R. 18) 
There was no objection to the billing made on Jan-
uary 16,1973 as shown by the interrogatories paragraph 
7. 
"Q. Did defendant or any of its agents object 
to the billing made on January 16, 1973 or 
thereafter . . .? 
A. Little America did not object to the bill-
ing made on January 16, 1973. However, 
Little America did answer this statement with 
a letter dated February 12, 1973 . . . which 
itemized the expenses incurred by Little 
America from December 1, 1972, until the 
bus was received in operable condition. • ." 
(R. 18, 19) 
The contract as originally agreed upon in January 
1972 was still fully in force and effect at the time of 
delivery of the bus January 16, 1973 and this completed 
performance by the plaintiff leaving a balance due and 
owing by the defendant of $18,514.37 for which the 
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defendant was immediately billed. (Ex. 8D) The plain-
tiff was entitled to receive any payment made thereafter 
as a payment on the account. The defendant was obli-
gated to make full payment of $18,514.37.* 
The invoice signed by defendants' agent on Janu-
ary 16, 1973 provided for payment of interest at the 
rate of 18% per annum, collection costs and reasonable 
attorneys fees if action is necessary for collection. 
Restatement of Contracts, Section One, defines a 
contract as: 
"a promise or a set of promises for the breach 
of which the law gives a remedy, or the per-
formance of which the law in some way recog-
nizes a duty." 
Section 310 states: 
"where the duty of a party to a contract has 
been discharged by reason of the application 
of the rules stated in this chapter, he is again 
subjected to the duty if he manifests a willing-
ness to go on with the contract in spite of facts 
operating to discharge him, and the other party 
either gives a sufficient consideration therefor 
or the rules of Sections 88, 90 or 298 are appli-
cable." 
P O I N T I I 
T H E COURT W A S I N E R R O R I N F I N D -
I N G AN ACCORD A N D S A T I S F A C T I O N BE-
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T W E E N T H E P A R T I E S W H I C H P E R M I T -
T E D T H E D E F E N D A N T S TO P A Y ONLY 
$25,107.11 R A T H E R T H A N T H E F U L L CON-
TRACT P R I C E O F $28,514.37. 
A. T H E R E W A S N E V E R AN ACCORD, 
A G R E E M E N T , OR COMPROMISE TO SET-
T L E F O R L E S S T H A N T H E F U L L CON-
TRACT P R I C E . 
1 Am Jur 2d, "Accord and Satisfaction," Section 
One states: 
"An accord and satisfaction may more 
properly be said to be a method of discharging 
a contract . . . by substituting for such contract 
or cause of action an agreement for the satis-
faction thereof and the execution of such sub-
stituted agreement." 
"To constitute an accord and satisfaction 
there must be an offer in full satisfaction of 
the obligation, accompanied by such acts and 
declarations as amount to a condition that if it 
is accepted, it is to be in full satisfaction, and 
the condition must be such that the party to 
whom the offer is made is bound to understand 
that if he accepts it, he does so subject to con-
ditions imposed/' 
"The accord is the agreement and the satis-
faction is the signature execution or perfor-
mance of such agreement," (Italics added) 
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Section Two indicates an accord and satisfaction 
is similar to a compromise and settlement. 
The plaintiff never agreed at any time to settle 
for a sum less than the full contract price. On the con-
trary the plaintiff continually refused defendant's re-
quest to discount $3,407.26. 
The record shows that the first significant conver-
sation concerning a discount occurred February 12, 
1973. Mr. Knight testifying on direct stated: 
"Q. You wrote a letter on February 12,1973, 
which is exhibit 6-D; that's your signature, 
isn't it? 
A. That is. 
Q. In connection with that letter were there 
conversations? 
A. There were. 
Q. Between you and who else? 
A. Mr. Knaus. 
Q. Can you remember whether there were 
conversations before the letter was prepared 
before that date, February 12, or what they 
were on that date? 
A. I believe we had a phone conversation 
prior to that date and I asked Mr. Knaus if I 
could meet with him and go over the matter 
before we proceeded further. And I believe it 
was on February 12th or thereabouts that he 
came to my office and we discussed the matter 
of the expenses. 
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Q. Will you relate the conversation on that 
day on that occasion in your office ? 
A. Yes . . . I explained that I was taking the 
November 30th date because that had been the 
date that was promised in association with the 
$10,000.00 check; and that I had accumulated 
my expenses since that date and I enumerated 
those and told him that these were expenses 
that we had incurred. And he said that they 
should be put down and they would go hack to 
the manufacturer so they—to see what they 
could do about it and that we would go from 
there. 
Q. Did you at that conversation exhibit any 
of the documentary support for those ex-
penses? 
A. I am not sure whether or not I actually 
went through the bills or not. I can't recall. 
They were attached to my letter of February 
12th." (R. 100,101) (Italics added) 
"Q. The response of Mr. Knaus was that he 
would go back to the manufacturer and see 
what could be done and he would go there . . . 
A. Not in November. That conversation 
occurred in February. (R. 123) 
Q. Mr. Knaus said in response to your ac-
cumulated expenses and your telling about it 
that he would go back to the manufacturer to 
see what could be done about it and you could 
go from there, isn't that it? 
A. Right." (R. 124) (Italics added) 
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This testimony by Mr. Knight, Vice President of 
the defendant corporation pursuant to question by his 
own attorney and on cross, clearly shows there was no 
accord or agreement on February 12, 1973 or before. 
When Mr. Knight enumerated the expenses, Mr. Knaus 
said, "that they should be put down and they would go 
back to the manufacturer so they-to see what they could 
do about it and that {(we would go from there/' Ap-
parently that very day Mr. Knight "put down" the ex-
penses in letter for and mailed them to Mr. Knaus, 
(Ex. 60) so that he would have something "to go back to 
the manufacturer to see what they could do about it" 
Obviously the final words "that we would go from 
there" shows there was no agreement but a tentative 
arrangement whereby a credit would be allowed con-
ditioned on the manufacturers allowing a credit to plain-
tiff. Mr. Knight had to allow plaintiff time to go back 
to the manufacturer so obviously the letter (Ex. 6D) 
was not an ultimatum nor a confirmation of a new agree-
ment but merely a statement of expenses, a statement 
which the plaintiff needed to send to the manufacturer. 
The statement of expenses (Ex. 6D) was sent in re-
sponse to plaintiff's request to have the expenses "put 
down" The letter was received as information and not as 
a statement ultimatum or demand to which they were 
expected to respond or acquiesce. (R. 100, 101) There 
was no accord at the time of the February 12th conver-
sation and there was no accord at the time the letter 
dated February 12th was received by plaintiff or latter. 
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B. T H E R E W A S N E V E R A SATISFAC-
T I O N OR S E T T L E M E N T O F T H E C L A I M 
F O R L E S S T H A N F U L L P A Y M E N T . 
After receiving a check dated February 17, 1973 
for $15,107.11, Mr. Knaus and Mr. Urie became worried 
and placed calls to Mr. Knight beginning February 27 
and 28, 1973 (R. 91) and finally made an appointment 
with Mr. Knight for March 5, 1973. (R. 92) At that 
meeting the discussion centered around the payment of 
$3,407.26 as shown by the following answers by Mr. 
Urie to his attorney's questions: 
"Q. What was the conversation relating to 
that you had with Mr. Knight on that appoint-
ment at March 5th? 
A. The conversation was relating to the pay-
ment that was—they said they wouldn't pay. 
Q. And what was it? 
A. The amount of $3,407.26. 
Q. And what was said? 
A. H e said he felt like that he didn't-wasn't 
- going to pay us this money and we said we 
felt like that he owed it to us." (R. 92, 93) 
Mr. Knight verified this conversation by saying 
in response to his attorney's question about the meeting: 
"A. Mr. Urie and Mr. Knaus came in and 
they said they had not been able to do anything 
with the manufacturer as far as obtaining any-
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thing from him; that in fact the manufacturer 
i had indicated that he would file an immediate 
suit against them if he did not pay and they 
were concerned about the license to present the 
the manufacturer or whatever the agreement 
they had. That they were not in a position to 
sustain the loss at Tates and they asked me to 
make payment. 
There was another element of the conversation 
which had to do with the bus that was now in 
Wyoming. And they had a document which 
they asked me to sign, which document indi-
cated that I had additional amounts due to 
them and that if I would sign that they would 
sign a document that could go to the State of 
Utah to license the vehicle. And I told them 
that I did not care to sign that and that I 
didn't feel that Little America was in the 
position to sustain the loss either. That it was 
not our fault that it had been late and we had 
incurred these costs and that was where the 
conversation ended basically." (R. 103) 
The check did not bear any statement on it to the 
effect that endorsement or cashing it meant acceptance 
as payment in full. Again we do not know when the 
check was cashed but it appears the parties had contact 
and that the check was merely accepted as payment on 
account and not as satisfaction of the account. (Ex. 8D) 
I t was quite logical for plaintiff to accept the check as 
payment on account because only five days before 
Mr. Knight talked with them about going back to the 
factory and he knew it would take more than five days. 
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The record shows clearly and consistently that 
plaintiff agreed only to check with the factory or manu-
facturer to see if he could get credit on the expenses for 
Mr, Knight (R. 69 Lines 14-16, 22-24) 
The plaintiff even pressed the matter to the extent 
that the manufacturer threatened to sue the plaintiff. 
Mr. Urie stated emphatically referring to a conversation 
with Mr. Knight, " . . . I told him that the deduction 
would not be allowed as far as Tates was concerned in 
the amount of $3,407.26." (R. 79) (R. 73) 
Obviously there was never an accord nor a satis-
faction as shown by plaintiff's consistent and adamant 
denial for allowing the deduction requested by defen-
dant. 
To further show there was no satisfaction the plain-
tiff immediately credited the $15,107.11 paid to the 
account of defendant on February 21, 1973 and entered 
a balance due of $3,407,26 (Ex. 8D) and immediately 
so billed the defendant. (R. 79) and so billed defendant 
at the end of each month thereafter (R. 79). 
There is no evidence indicating when the check was 
cashed—the defendant did not produce the original check 
or even a copy of it to show dates or endorsements. But 
an accord cannot be presumed by either the letter or 
acceptance of the check in view of the facts above. 
The check contained no statement indicating the 
acceptance or cashing of the check would mean payment 
in full. There was a stub attached to the check explain-
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ing the computations arriving at the sum of $15,107.11. 
(Ex. 7D) This did not surprise or greatly alarm Mr. 
Knaus or Mr. Urie at first because of the understanding 
that they would try to recover the $3,407.26 from the 
factory (R. 100) but there was sufficient concern to 
promptly check with Mr. Knight to make sure he did 
not misunderstand their position and to clarify the fact 
that $3,407.26 was still due. (R. 91, 92, 103) 
In order for plaintiff to be held for an accord and 
satisfaction it must have accepted the proposal of defen-
dant, this was never done. 17 Am Jur 2nd Contracts, 
Section 41 states the principal that an acceptance must 
be definite not qualified or conditional. Section 375 in 
referring to substantial performance in keeping with 
the liberal rule accepted by most modern authorities 
holds that: 
"Where one party to a contract has received 
and retained the benefits of substantial partial 
performance of an agreement, the other party 
cannot retain the benefits and repudiate the 
burdens of the contract and is bound to per-
form." 
Under this rule the defendant is bound to pay the bal-
ance due on the contract to the plaintiff. 
Probably the best Utah case on the subject is a 
1962 case, 13 Ut. 2nd 142 Dillman v. Massey Ferguson, 
Inc. In this case the defendant manufacturer agreed 
to pay certain bonuses and to buy back certain supply 
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parts upon termination of the agency. After an agree-
ment to terminate was consumated and the manufacturer 
sent a check which did not cover all of the items to be 
paid for. With the check was a letter stating, "the 
amount due in full to complete recent buy-back on your 
account". Though the contract was to continue to Oct. 
31 the contract was modified when appellant voluntarily 
agreed to pay a bonus in consideration of respondent's 
voluntary termination. 
The Supreme Court held that acceptance and cash-
ing of defendant's check by plaintiff after plaintiff 
protested that the check did not take care of all that was 
due him under the agreement with defendant did not 
amount to accord and satisfaction, though a letter was 
sent by defendant with the check stated that the check 
represented amount due in full to complete recent buy 
back by defendant, where dispute was not as to the 
amount due plaintiff by defendant for items which were 
bought back by defendant, but as to whether defendant 
breached contract by refusing to buy back items re-
jected by defendant. 
The court further said: 
"In view of the dispute in this case as to the 
purpose of the check, the trial court could be-
lieve, as it did, that the sending and acceptance 
of the check was in no way related to anything 
other than a payment for items actually bought 
back by appellant." 
The Court quoted favorably 1 Am Jur Section 31: 
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"In some instances, the words 'in full payment' 
or those of similar tenor, do not necessarily 
import or prove an accord, for it may be that 
there is more than one account pending between 
the parties, or the check may be qualified by 
concurrent transactions or letters.. ." 
There is a strong similarity between our case and the 
Dillman case except that Tates has a much stronger 
position as plaintiff than Dillman had in that the letter 
sent to Tates by defendant did not accompany the 
check and was not related to the check in any way. I t 
did not even mention or apparently anticipate a check 
and in no way controlled the disposition of the check. 
The letter did not contain any controlling words such 
as "in full payment" nor did the check. Certainly the 
court here can, as in the Dillman case, treat the check 
as "in no way related to anything other than payment 
for items actually bought back. . ." or payment on ac-
count. As mentioned above the letter was sent for an-
other purpose and not to direct the handling of the 
check. In our case as in the Dillman case the plaintiff 
promptly advised the defendant that the check was not 
being accepted as payment in full. Section 18 of I Am 
Jur 2nd states: 
"The fact that a remittance by check purport-
ing to be "in full" is accepted and used does 
not result in an accord and satisfaction if the 
claim involved is liquidated and undisputed, 
under the general accepted rule that an accord 
and satisfaction does not result from the part-
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payment of a liquidated and undisputed 
claim." > 
Some further pertinent section from 1 Am Jur 2nd are 
as follows: > 
Section 11 "The question whether there has 
been an accord and satisfaction is ordinarily 
a question of intention.. . ." 
Obviously there was no agreement nor any intention on 
the part of plaintiff, Tates, Inc., to settle for less than 
the full balance due and owing of $3,40.26: 
Section 12 ". . . I t is universally recognized 
that one of the essential requirements of a valid 
accord and satisfaction is that it be based upon 
or supported by a good or valuable considera-
tion." ". . . where the subject of the accord and 
satisfaction is a liquidated demand and the 
creditor has accepted an amount less than his 
demand, the accord and satisfaction can, in 
absence of statute, be supported only if some 
consideration outside of the amount paid in 
satisfaction exists." 
Section 14 "A valid accord and satisfaction 
may result from an offer of payment of money 
upon an unliquidated demand conditioned 
upon its being received in full satisfaction of 
the indebtedness and the acceptance thereof by 
the creditor, and conversely, and accord satis-
faction will not result if the offer was not 
made or accepted with the intent that it should 
operate as a satisfaction/' (Italics added) 
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Another excellent case consistent with the Dillman 
case is the following Utah U. S. District Court case: 
Nevada Half Moon Mining Co. vs. Combined 
Metals Reduction Co., 1949 Utah Federal District 
Court Case 176 Federal 2nd 73. 
The District Court held for the defendant finding 
there was an accord and satisfaction but the Court of 
Appeals reversed in favor of the plaintiff finding that 
a payment of a royalty to grantor of mining property 
pursuant to contract by check reciting it was in full 
payment of items listed on voucher attached to state-
ment and settlement sheet after a controversy arose re-
specting payment did not constitute an effective dis-
charge of grantee's obligation. There were several pay-
ments by check; each check recited it was in full pay-
ment and was accompanied by detailed statements. Each 
check was accepted, endorsed and cashed. 
The Court went on to say: 
"Essential elements of an effective accord and 
satisfaction are proper subject matter, compe-
tent parties, meeting of minds of parties and 
consideration, and its most common pattern is 
a mutual agreement between parties in which 
one pays or performs and another accepts pay-
ment or performance in satisfaction of claim or 
demand which is a bona fide dispute.'' 
Certainly this case reflects the law in the State of 
Utah. This ruling doesTcsanction one mi forcing on a 
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party a contract which was not intended. In our case 
there are not nearly as many elements which would tend 
to show an accord and satisfaction as in the Federal case 
yet this court found there was no accord and satisfac-
tion. (Italics added) 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E COURT E R R O R E D I N A L L O W I N G 
D E F E N D A N T $239.76 R E P A I R COSTS ON A 
C O U R T E S Y BUS L O A N E D TO D E F E N D A N T 
F R E E O F C H A R G E A N D I N D E N Y I N G 
P L A I N T I F F S C L A I M F O R $845.00 COSTS TO 
O V E R H A U L T H E MOTOR W H E N D E F E N -
D A N T R E T U R N E D T H E BUS I N AN I N O P -
E R A T I V E CONDITION. 
Because of the defendant's concern about its need 
during the summer for another bus the plaintiff located 
a bus in Boise, Idaho, bought it for $1816.00, drove 
it to Salt Lake City and turned it over to defendant for 
its use without charge in July 1972. (R. 57-59, 120) 
There was no obligation by contract to provide the 
bus; it was turned over to Little America strictly as a 
courtesy without charge. (R. 60, 98) 
The defendant returned the bus in about Decem-
ber, 1972 in such poor condition that it had to have a 
complete motor overhaul at a cost to plaintiff of 
$845.00. (R. 80) The defendant never so much as ques-
tioned this cost at the trial and yet the lower Court com-
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pletely ignored the claim as originally set forth in plain-
tiff s Reply. 
The bus traveled 250 miles a day. (R. 112, 113) 
I t traveled during the heaviest traffic time during the 
busiest and hottest time of the year. (R. 119) Driving 
a bus fully loaded in the heat of the summer 250 miles 
a day is extremely heavy use and very hard on any type 
of equipment. The defendant surely knew they must 
at least repair the vericle if they received the equipment, 
tires, etc. free of charge. They would have to repair 
their own equipment as part of their operating expense 
surely the court can not hold the plaintiff to re-
pair the equipment when it had been turned over to de-
fendant for use as its own without any charge. The de-
fendant literally burned up the motor and then demand-
ed the plaintiff pay for sum $239.76 for motor repairs 
repairs near the end of November, 1972. The cost of 
these repairs were assessed against the plaintiff by the 
lower Court without justification and wholly in error. 
We hope the court will consider how ridiculous it 
is to penalize the plaintiff for the defendant's damage 
to a free bus when defendant should be paying the plain-
tiff at the rate of $62.00 or $75.00 per day (cost of rent-
ing a bus R. 112). Using the lower figure of $62.00 at 
a conservative use period of four months the total rental 
value of plaintiff's contribution was at least $7,440. The 
defendant tried to claim other cost incurred before De-
cember. The court permitted testimony on these matters 
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over the objections of plaintiff's counsel though the 
judgment did not include these costs. 
The court allowed testimony on costs of operating 
a bus and testimony on the reasonableness of such cost 
from Mr. Knight who was shown by the Voir Dire ques-
tions of plaintiff's attorney to not be qualified as a suf-
ficient expert to do so. (R. 107) 
Mr. Knight is a business man, an office man (R. 
108) with offices principally in Salt Lake City. Little 
America has a manager in Wyoming who takes charge 
of the buses, dispatches them and sees that buses are 
available, fueled and repaired. This Wyoming Manager 
also arranged for the rental of buses. (R. 107) Mr. 
Knight's testimony concerning costs was allowed over 
the objections of the plaintiff. (R. 108) The witnessed 
was clearly mixed up in referring to costs of oper-
ating and costs of renting a bus. The court cannot from 
the evidence here determine how charges should be as-
sessed even if they were justified. (R. 112, 114) Mr. 
Knight stated the 22 to 25 cents per mile he was charg-
ing the plaintiff included fuel and oil (R. 114). I t 
should be obvious to the court that fuel and oil would 
have to be paid if defendant was using its own bus. The 
cost of fuel should not have been assessed against 
plaintiff. This shows defendants' figures are all off be-
cause Mr. Knight arrived at his $62.50 per day figure 
by multiplying 250 per mile times 250 miles per day. 
There was no testimony concerning the need for the 
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service nor covering the reasonableness of the $239.76. 
No mechanic appeared to justify the charge. 
P O I N T IV 
T H E COURT E R R O R E D I N A L L O W I N G 
D E F E N D A N T ' S COST I N R E N T I N G A BUS 
B E A S S E S S E D A G A I N S T T H E P L A I N T I F F 
A N D F O R A L L O W I N G U N R E A S O N A B L E 
COSTS TO B E A S S E S S E D . 
There is absolutely nothing in the agreement be-
tween the parties that would permit defendant to claim 
damages against the plaintiff for a delay in delivery. 
Some contracts are written that way but this contract 
did not provide for relief if delivery was not made as 
required. As stated before no new contract was entered 
into. Mr. Knight arbitrarily set December 1, 1972 as 
some sort of a cut off date and unilaterally agreed with 
himself that this was a good time to start assessing 
charges. Apparently he based this on the fact that Mr. 
Knaus thought, after checking with the factory, that the 
bus would be ready for delivery the last of November. 
Mr. Knaus made no promises, no guarantees and no 
agreements; he merely told Mr. Knight that he "felt 
confident" it could be delivered near the last of Novem-
ber. There was no agreements, oral or otherwise, or any 
other basis upon which defendant could base a claim. 
The charges assessed by the defendant were exces-
sive. A bus could have been rented for much less by the 
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month. At the rate of $75 a day the defendant would 
have paid out $27,375 a year if it was a seven day week 
operation. If the costs of operating were 25 cents per 
mile as stated by Mr. Knight (R. 114) a good share 
of that would be costs of fuel and oil (R. 114) which 
would have to be paid by defendant anyhow and should 
not be a part of the charges against the plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
A clear look at the law as well as good legal reason-
ing shows that the lower court was in error and that 
there was no Accord and Satisfaction which would bar 
the plaintiff from recovery of the balance due and owing 
on the contract of $3,407.26. Even if the court could 
find an Accord and Satisfaction there is no basis for 
defendant to claim plaintiff should pay it's cost for hir-
ing a bus when there is no provision for recovery in case 
of delayed delivery in the contract. 
The assessment of $239.76 against plaintiff to re-
pair a bus that plaintiff had bought for and practically 
given to defendant borders on and arbitrary and ca-
pricious action by the lower court. On the other hand 
to ignore the claim of plaintiff for repair costs of $845.00 
for damage done to the bus by the defendant when they 
had free use of it for four to five months is almost equal-
ly arbitrary and capricious. 
W H E R E F O R E , we pray the Honorable Court 
reverse the lower court and award the plaintiff judg-
ment for the sum of $3,407.26 at the rate of 18 percent 
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interest per annum from January 16,1973, with $845.00 
damages at the rate of 6% interest from the same time, 
costs of this action and reasonable attorney's fees of 
$1500.00. 
Dated this 26th day of July, 1974. 
Respectfully submitted, 
K E I T H E. SOHM 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
330 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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